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Introduction 
 
A central aim of the current EU growth strategy Europe 2020 (EC 2012) is to stimulate the 
growth of high innovation, high job quality firms that create more and better jobs, which in turn 
tackle social inclusion and inequalities. Whilst innovation can destroy jobs, in the long-run, 
innovation and employment creation are complementary. Cross-country analysis finds that 
innovation links to productivity and more productive firms create additional jobs (OECD 2010). 
Moreover innovative firms in more innovative countries have higher employment growth and 
their employment tends to be higher quality (de Kok et al. 2011). Innovative firms can also be 
inclusive, enveloping workers marginalised in the labour market (Dutz et al. 2011; OECD 
2010). It is not surprising therefore that the European Commission (EC) regards innovation as 
an over-arching driver of EU growth (EC 2013a): the Innovation Union is one of the seven 
flagship initiatives within Europe 2020. 
Unfortunately, the innovation performance of the EU lags behind key international competitors 
such as the US and Japan and its lead over new competitors such as China is decreasing (EC 
2013a). There are also innovation performance differences between the EU member states 
which, after a period of convergence, have widened with the global financial crisis (Mako et al. 
2014). Boosting innovation within the EU is therefore not a new but long-standing policy 
concern. The aim of this QuInnE Working Paper is to evaluate key past and current EU 
innovation policies relevant to job quality and employment. The Working Paper first 
summarises the two approaches that dominate thinking about innovation. It then outlines the 
evolution of EU policy on innovation over the past twenty years, followed by a short critique 
of this policy. The final section offers comments and recommendations about how EU 
innovation policy might be developed in the future in order to better meet the innovation 
challenge facing Europe.  
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1 Evaluation of the European innovation policy relevant to job 
quality and employment 
 
There are two stylized approaches within innovation policies. In the first, more traditional and 
narrow approach, innovation is regarded as a linear process, where the source of all innovation 
activity is scientific research. The results of scientific basic research are transformed into 
engineering and manufacturing products, which are then sold through marketing and sales 
activities. Within this approach innovation is mainly about creating radically new products or 
processes; any incremental innovations are regarded as of secondary importance. The emphasis 
of this narrow science-focused approach to innovation is thus the generation of new explicit 
knowledge and ideas. Innovation is technological and primarily occurs in ‘high-tech’ industrial 
sectors. With an emphasis on science and the generation of explicit knowledge, policies aim to 
improve both the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of higher education e.g. by raising the 
number of PhD students produced and improving the research base of EU countries.  
Within this narrow approach the main rationale for state intervention in innovation is an 
assumption of market failure (Fagerberg 2014). It is embedded in the neo-classical stream of 
the economics in which self-regulated markets create optimal resource allocation. According to 
this argument, innovation has ‘public good’ properties inhibiting firms from investing as much 
in innovation as the ‘optimum level’ would require.  Innovation requires investments from firms 
but the benefits of these efforts are risky, hard to monopolize and will diffuse across the whole 
economy, thus limiting returns to firms that might choose to invest in innovation. Therefore 
‘rational firms’ avoid innovation activities, resulting in under-investment in it. If self-regulating 
markets are unable to provide the ‘optimum level’ of innovation investment, justification then 
exists for state intervention. 
Schienstock and Hamalainen (2001) critique this traditional narrow approach to innovation by 
underlining its implicit assumptions: innovation is understood as an exceptional event; 
innovation and the process of knowledge creation is seen as an isolated process; problems of 
uncertainty remain unsolved; R&D is supposed to be the main (if not the only) source of 
innovation; and it neglects collaborative elements of innovation. As they note, there is an 
increasing volume of evidence that suggests that the linear model of innovation represents the 
exception rather than the rule, and it is difficult to find a direct causal link between new 
scientific knowledge and innovation.  
Schienstock and Hamalainen (2001) contrast the science-based understanding of innovation 
with an activity-based understanding of innovation which can take place anytime and anywhere. 
Instead of being a single event, innovation, they argue, should be regarded as a continuous 
process related to the everyday practice of organisations. As such incremental innovations are 
important with tacit, rather than explicit, knowledge being important. Another basic feature of 
innovation, they point out, is its uncertainty. In order to cope with this inherent uncertainty, 
Schienstock and Hamalainen propose a recursive model of innovation as opposed to the linear 
one: ‘Because of this uncertainty, we cannot identify clear sequences of stages in innovation 
processes; instead, we have to analyse innovation as a recursive process, in which particular 
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innovation activities can become both cause and effect, consequence and prerequisite’ (p.51.). 
In this approach, the triggers of innovation may vary depending on the case, there are multiple 
actors involved in the process of innovation and there are ‘complicated feedback mechanisms 
and interactive relationships’ among them (p.51).  
This broader, recursive model of innovation implies a different policy approach. Trust relations, 
strong cooperation and intense social interactions between actors ensure the necessary flow of 
information and knowledge, with continuous learning having a central role in this broader 
model, and the social embeddedness of innovation has to be recognised. This different approach 
required of policy is best reflected in accounts of national innovation systems. In this view, each 
country represents a specific case with specific actors and institutions, with unique relationships 
among them. National systems of innovation evolve historically and show path-dependent 
characteristics. It is also implied that there are no universal policy solutions or instruments that 
can be effectively implemented independent of the circumstances of any given country. 
Working within this approach, Ramstad (2014) proposes an innovation ecosystem model. This 
‘expanded triple helix’ innovation-generating model, with interrelated actors and processes at 
different levels, has a number of aspects: 
1. it uses a much broader scope of innovation including organisational, service and policy 
innovations;  
2. it does not limit the key actors in policy shaping to those in public sector institutions but 
includes representatives of employers’ association and trade union, and recognises that 
that enterprises are the main driver of innovation;  
3. there are thus players and process at both micro, meso and macro levels, moreover 
changes at one level imply changes at the other levels;  
4. intra-organisational relationships are just as important as inter-organisational dynamics; 
5. within enterprises, emphasis is placed on high-involvement practices that lever 
innovation e.g. autonomous working teams, management-employee relationships and 
employee-driven innovation, and which can enhance both firm productivity and quality 
of working life. 
 
These two approaches to innovation – narrow and broad – imply two different knowledge 
management models because they rely on two different types of knowledge. According to 
Jensen et al. (2004), the narrow approach can be characterized by the STI-mode (Science, 
Technology, Innovation) of knowledge management system that focuses on codifying  explicit, 
abstract knowledge, while the broad approach involves tacit and ‘often highly localized’ 
knowledge where Doing, Using and Interacting, the DUI-mode of knowledge management, is 
important. The two approaches are characterised in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Narrow and broad approaches to innovation 
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Dimensions Narrow Approach Broad Approach 
Model of innovation Linear Recursive 
Dominant form of innovation Radical Incremental Technological Non-technological 
Knowledge base Scientific, explicit and individual Practical, tacit and collective 
Mode of innovation STI-mode DUI-mode 
Sector Manufacturing Not sector specific 
Policy implications Market failure approach System approach 
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2 The evolution of the concept of innovation in European 
innovation policies 
 
This section describes and evaluates how the concept of innovation has changed across different 
European Commission policy documents over the past 15-20 years. The examination of the 
content of these documents draws on the theoretical framework summarised in the previous 
section. It should be noted he EC has produced a large number of innovation policy documents 
over this time and a meta-analysis of these documents is beyond the scope of this working 
paper. Instead, prefaced by the 1995 Green Paper on Innovation, this review examines the most 
important innovation policy documents related to the  two key ten-year strategies of the EC, 
namely the Lisbon Strategy and Horizon 2020. 
Green Paper on Innovation (1995) 
 
One of the very first documents intended to determine innovation policy at the European level 
was the Green Paper on Innovation adopted in 1995 (EC 1995). The first edition of the Oslo 
Manual which defined types of innovation and its ways of measurement had been recently 
approved (OECD, 1992) and on the basis of the Manual the first wave of the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS) was launched in 1993. Organised by Eurostat and carried out by 
national statistical offices, the CIS was the first coordinated survey of innovation activities and 
initially covered 12 European countries using a standardized methodology and questionnaire 
(Godin 2002). Since then, there have been nine waves of the survey and it became the largest 
survey on innovation in the world. However, it is organised on a voluntary basis, with the result 
that it does not cover all Member States of the EU.1  
 
The objective of the Green Paper was to identify key factors and policy measures through which 
innovation activity could be enhanced in the EU. Although the opening definition of innovation 
adopted in this strategic document was quite vague – ‘the successful production, assimilation 
and exploitation of novelty in the economic and social spheres’ (EC 1995: 1) – the document 
does later include definitions for product, process and organisational innovation. The document 
also emphasized the role of the public sector and the importance of innovation culture generally 
as well as an appreciation of firm-level practice and capabilities, as the document puts it 
‘innovation is … the introduction of changes in management, work organisation, and the 
working conditions and skills of the workforce’ (p.1). 
 
In relation to the theoretical framework briefly sketched in the previous section, the Green Paper 
vacillates between the broad and narrow approaches to innovation. The document recognizes 
that innovation is not a linear process but involves dense interactions of different actors. 
Reflecting the broad approach it states that innovation: 
 
1 For a detailed description of the countries participating in different waves of CIS, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/community-innovation-survey 
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… is not a linear process, with clearly-delimited sequences and automatic follow-on, 
but rather a system of interactions, of comings and goings between different functions 
and different players whose experience, knowledge and know-how are mutually 
reinforcing and cumulative. This is why more and more importance is attached in 
practice to mechanisms for interaction within the firm (collaboration between the 
different units and participation of employees in organisational innovation), as well as 
to the networks linking the firm to its environment (other firms, support services, centres 
of expertise, research laboratories, etc.). Relations with the users, taking account of 
demand expressed, and anticipating the needs of the market and society are just as 
important – if not more so – than a mastery of the technology. (EC 1995: 1) 
The Green Paper also distinguishes between radical and incremental innovation, giving equal 
importance to both kinds of innovation. The document also argues that organisational 
innovation plays a crucial role in being a necessary precondition for the success of other forms 
of innovation and that Europe lags behind its competitors in this field. As to which sectors are 
innovation-centred, the document remains neutral, recognizing the importance of innovation 
not only in high-tech sectors but also in agriculture, services and even the public sector. The 
latter is particularly noteworthy given that the CIS omits to survey the public sector.2  
Despite this rhetoric, there is a noticeable gap between the theoretical orientation of the Green 
Paper and the measures proposed; whilst the former reflects the broad approach to innovation, 
the latter are grounded in the narrow approach of innovation. In this respect, the document refers 
to one of the most important weaknesses faced by the EU being the so-called ‘European 
paradox’. This term refers to the fact that while Europe performs well in terms of basic scientific 
research it struggles to transform its scientific excellence into commercial success compared to 
its main competitors: at that time  the US and Japan.3 This analysis had a long-lasting impact 
on the orientation of European innovation policies, focusing mainly on patent regulation, tax 
incentives and stronger collaboration between R&D sectors and industry, strengthening the 
technology absorption capacity of SMEs etc. Although from an innovation theoretical point of 
view, this document can be evaluated as one which fully applies the broad approach, in terms 
of policy measures it remains technology-oriented. In the second part of the Green Paper, the 
Commission proposes a full set of actions that has to be taken in order to improve innovation 
capacity of both firms and individuals in the European Union. None of the 13 measures4 listed 
2 The EC only piloted a survey of  public sector innovation in the early 2010s following the 
Innovation Union initiative, see http://www.technopolis-group.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/1540_EIS-2011-12_EPSIS-2013.pdf 
3 The question to what extent this statement was true at that time is not investigated in this 
Working Paper. However, note that according to the Green Paper by 1993 there already existed a 
significant gap between the US, Japan and the EU in R&D expenditure as a share of GDP (2.7%, 
2.8% and 2.0% respectively) and the gap was widening. 
4 The Green Paper defines 13 Route of actions as follows: Develop technology monitoring and 
foresight, Better direct research efforts towards innovation, Develop initial and further training, 
Further the mobility of students and researchers, Promote recognition of the benefits of innovation, 
Improve the financing of innovation, Set-up fiscal régime beneficial to innovation, Promoting 
intellectual and industrial property, Simplify administrative procedures, A favourable legal and 
regulatory framework, Develop ‘economic intelligence’ actions, Encourage innovation in 
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link to non-technological innovation but instead reflect a narrow approach especially 
emphasizing the importance of technological innovation, scientific, explicit and individual 
knowledge-base, the STI mode of innovation and the manufacturing sector. This dissonance 
between theoretical grounding and the focus on particular measures is a pattern that can be 
identified in subsequent EU innovation policy. 
In terms of the relationship between innovation and the quantitative and qualitative aspects of 
employment, the Green Paper emphasizes mainly the former. It is argued that product 
innovation boosts employment by increasing demand and thus investment. Process innovations, 
for their part, also increase employment because it increases firm productivity or lowers 
production costs. As such, in the long term, a positive effect on employment growth may occur. 
However, the relationship between innovation and job quality is poorly developed in the 
document. There is appreciation that ‘by its nature innovation is a collective process which 
needs the gradual commitment of an increasing number of partners. In this respect, the 
motivation and participation of employees is critical for its success’ (p.11). However the 
document also warns of a trade-off between the quantity and quality of jobs: whilst ‘innovation 
generally improves living and working conditions, care has to be taken that new methods of 
organising work (such as just-in-time working) do not jeopardise jobs’ (p.11). 
First phase of Lisbon Strategy and the changes in the innovation concept 
(2000-2004) 
 
The aim of the Lisbon Strategy (2000) was to create a knowledge-based economy and society 
as the basis for the EU becoming the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world.5 
The Strategy defined three strategic goals: sustainable economic growth; more and better jobs; 
and greater social cohesion. In the context of wanting to create a knowledge-based economy, it 
is not surprising that innovation quickly became a core issue. There were two main initiatives 
intended to foster innovation. The first was the establishment of the European Area of Research 
and Innovation; the second was to create friendly environments for start-ups and SMEs. 
 
With respect to the first initiative, the European Research Area (ERA) is a tool to coordinate 
research activities at the national and European level in order to support Europe’s best 
researchers and scientists. This aim could be achieved, argued the Strategy by – among other 
things – developing joint research programmes, creating an environment that stimulates 
increased private investments in R&D, benchmarking national R&D policies, establishing the 
European Innovation Scoreboard, fostering the mobility of European researchers and creating 
a common European patent protection. 
The second initiative aimed to increase the competitiveness and dynamism of the business 
sector by creating a friendlier environment especially for start-ups and SMEs. To do so involved 
lowering the costs and the administrative burdens of doing business. Encouraging interfaces 
enterprises, especially SMEs, and strengthen the regional dimension of innovation, Update public 
action for innovation. 
5 The Lisbon Strategy is available: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm 
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between the partners of the Triple Helix models and advisory services and other types of 
business angels also became a priority. In support of this initiative the European Investment 
Bank launched its Innovation 2000 Initiative6 covering five main areas: human capital 
formation; research and development; information and communications technology networks; 
diffusion of innovation; development of SMEs and entrepreneurship. 
Despite the reference to partners and the triple helix model, these two initiatives reveal scant 
attention in these key policy documents to the broad approach to innovation. In fact, the only 
quantifiable innovation related objective of the Strategy was to increase the share of R&D 
expenditures in the GDP from 1.9% to 3% by 2010 and to raise the proportion of private sector 
generated GDP from 55% to 67% of the total. According to the document’s estimations, such 
growth would lever an additional 0.5% GDP growth and 400,000 additional jobs per year after 
2010.7 However, to do so would have required an annual growth rate of 6% for the public sector 
and 9% for the private sector – figures that were never realised. It should also be said that 
although innovation is recognised as playing a crucial role in achieving another strategic 
objective – increasing the European employment rate from 61% to 70% – its impact on job 
quality was not  explored in any detail despite the policy desire to create better, not just more, 
jobs.  
The implementation of the Lisbon Strategy was achieved in three main phases. This first period, 
known as Lisbon I, occurred between 2000 and 2004. This phase was followed by a mid-term 
review and a second phase of the Strategy over 2005 to 2008, known as Lisbon II. This mid-
term review resulted in a slightly modified innovation strategy European Partnership for 
Growth and Jobs and in an Action Plan More Research and Innovation – a Common Approach. 
The third phase was the continuation of Lisbon II in the context of global financial crisis and 
economic downturn.  
Before the mid-term review, the European Commission also issued a communication updating 
the concept of innovation8 and also had an action plan.9 Both documents were approved in 
2003. The strategy (EC 2003:a) represents a theoretical shift from linear to a systemic model of 
innovation: 
Important though research is as the source of invention, innovation encompasses more 
than the successful application of research results. The evolution of the innovation 
concept – from the linear model having R&D as the starting point to the systemic model 
in which innovation arises from complex interactions between individuals, 
organisations and their operating environment – demonstrates that innovation policies 
must extend their focus beyond the link with research. (EC 2003a: 4) 
6 See in detail: http://cordis.europa.eu/finance/src/inno2000.htm 
7 European Commission, 2003(b). 
8 EC (2003a). 
9 EC (2003b). 
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In addition to the R&D-based linear approach, the document also recognises the importance of 
incremental innovations, value-innovation10, organisational and business model innovation, 
and design and marketing innovation. Interestingly, the document criticized previous 
innovation policies: ‘Although it is the systemic model that now dominates in policy 
discussions, many measures put into practice with the intention to promote innovation still 
appear to owe more to the linear view’ it admitted (EC, 2003a:7) – whilst maintaining the 
strategic aim of raising R&D expenditure to 3% of GDP. 
This broadening of the approach to innovation involved not just a shift in the focus of innovation 
policy but also recognition that enterprises are at the heart of innovation. As such the most 
important target of innovation policy should be enterprises, their behaviour, capacities and 
environment. In parallel with this shift, statistical data analysis was also to be reviewed: ‘These 
models also colour measurements of the innovation process and innovation performance, which 
are usually biased towards indicators of technological innovation’ (EC 2003a: 7). 
While the policy upgrading document explored the new broad-based approach of innovation, 
the action plan that came later in the same year reflected less of elements from the renewed 
concept of innovation elaborated a few months earlier. The only focus of the action plan was to 
design policy initiatives to help to reach the Barcelona objective – that is, to increase the average 
research investment level from 1.9% of GDP to 3% of GDP by 2010 and of which two-thirds 
should come from the private sector.11 Although the plan notes in footnote 8 that: 
‘Technological innovation must often be combined with other forms of innovation, such as in 
design, marketing and business organisation, in order to draw the full commercial benefit.’ (EC, 
2003b:7), initiatives aimed to boost organisational or other non-technological innovation are 
absent from the action plan. Instead it determines four main sets of action aiming at: 
1. Harmonisation of policy mixes adopted by the Member States and the creation of a 
European Technology Platform 
2. Considerably improving public support to research and technological innovation 
3. Reach the necessary increase in the levels of public funding for research 
4. Improving the environment of research and technological innovation in Europe: 
intellectual property protection, regulation of product markets and related standards, 
competition rules, financial markets, the fiscal environment, and the treatment of 
research in companies’ management and reporting practices. (EC 2013b: 4) 
Whilst both the policy document (EC 2003a) and the action plan (EC 2003b) emphasize the 
important role that innovation plays in boosting employment, the quality of this employment 
was not taken into consideration in either text. This absence is not surprising given that among 
the structural indicators intended to continuously monitor the success of the implementation 
process of the Lisbon Strategy and approved by the European Council in March 2000 none are 
aimed at measuring non-technological innovation or issues related to job quality (beside life-
10 This notion was popular at the end of the 1990s and refers to innovation as the main driving force 
in the search for new markets, and can occur via radical as well as incremental innovation. 
11 This objective was officially by the European Council in meeting held in Barcelona on March 
2002.  
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long learning12 and accidents at work). Instead the indicators focus on employment rates 
(including that of older workers), unemployment rates, the gender pay gap and the tax rate on 
low-wage earners; the innovation and research section included indicators such as public 
expenditure on education, total R&D expenditure, the level of Internet access, the number of 
science and technology graduates, patenting activities, venture capital investments and ICT 
expenditure. In other words, reflecting the narrow approach to innovation. Although it was 
planned from 2000 to develop indicators measuring job quality, that intention was never 
realised. They are  still missing from the headline indicators accompanying the Europe 2020 
strategy which retained two rough indicators: the employment rate of those aged between 20-
64 years of age (the target being 3% by 2020) and the gross domestic expenditure on R&D (the 
target is 3% by 2020). 
Mid-term review and the second phase of the Lisbon Strategy (2005-2008) 
 
The first phase of the Lisbon process ended in 2004 and was followed by a mid-term review. 
The strategic objectives of the Lisbon Strategy had not been achieved: the gap in 
competitiveness had widened compared to North America and Asia; the employment rate of 
the EU-15 countries did not rise to 65% and the share of R&D expenditure was 1.83% of the 
EU-15 GDP according to Eurostat. Nevertheless, the mid-term review led by a High-Level 
Expert Group headed by Wim Kok (EC, 2004) did not rewrite the Strategy’s objectives; instead 
it proposed a narrowing of their focus and urged more effective implementation through better 
governance and mobilisation. As one of the key documents evaluating the Lisbon Strategy 
noted:  
 
… the conclusions of the mid-term review were very critical, especially as regards the 
design of the Strategy: an overly ambitious agenda; excessively numerous and often 
contradictory priorities; poor coordination of policies in different areas; and a limited 
sense of urgency and commitment at national political level. It also subscribed to the 
idea of limiting the number of objectives and targets, focusing on ‘growth and jobs’ and 
placing concrete measures ahead of the strictly quantified targets for 2010. (European 
Parliament 2010:38) 
Innovation remained a core issue in the renewed agenda as an engine for both growth and 
employment. The mid-term review did not result in any significant changes in innovation 
policy. After reviewing the Lisbon Strategy, the Commission issued several important 
communications. The first (EC 2005a: Working together for growth and jobs – A new start for 
the Lisbon Strategy) is a general reorientation of the Strategy based on the Wim Kok Report. 
The second (EC 2005b: More research and innovation – investing for growth and employment: 
a common approach) is a more specific policy guideline about the next steps needed in the field 
of research and innovation. Both of these documents are derived from Integrated Guidelines. 
Based on the Wim Kok Report (EC 2004) the Commission summarized the main objectives of 
the renewed Lisbon Strategy into the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs, 2005-2008 
(EC 2005c). These Integrated Guidelines were divided into two parts, the first dealt with broad 
12 Life-long learning refers to the adult participation in education and training. 
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economic policy; the second with employment. The first includes a special section on how to 
boost innovation. Among the 23 guidelines, four are dedicated to measures related to 
innovation: 
Guideline No. 12. To increase and improve investment in R&D: ‘Member States 
should further develop the mix of measures to foster business R&D through: improved 
framework conditions and ensuring that companies operate in a sufficiently competitive 
environment; increased and more effective public expenditure on R&D; strengthening 
centres of excellence; making better use of support mechanisms, such as fiscal measures 
to leverage private R&D; ensuring a sufficient supply of qualified researchers by 
attracting more students into scientific, technical and engineering disciplines and 
enhancing the career development and the transnational and intersectoral mobility of 
researchers.’ (p.21) 
Guideline No. 13. To facilitate innovation and the take up of ICT: ‘Member States 
should focus on improvements in innovation support services, in particular for 
technology transfer, the creation of innovation poles and networks bringing together 
universities and enterprises, the encouragement of knowledge transfer through FDI, 
better access to finance and affordable and clearly defined intellectual property rights. 
They should facilitate the uptake of ICT and related changes in the organisation of work 
in the economy.’ (p.22) 
Guideline No. 14. To encourage the sustainable use of resources and strengthen the 
synergies between environmental protection and growth: ‘Member States should 
give priority to the internalisation of external environmental costs; to increasing energy 
efficiency and to the development and application of environment-friendly 
technologies. The implementation of these priorities should be in line with existing 
European commitments and with the actions and instruments proposed in the 
Environmental Technologies Action Plan (ETAP), through the use of market-based 
instruments, risk funds and R&D funding, greening of public procurement and the 
removal of environmentally harmful subsidies alongside other policy instruments.’ 
(p.23) 
Guideline No. 15. To contribute to a strong industrial base: ‘Member States should 
focus on the development of new technologies and markets. This implies in particular 
commitment to the setting up and implementation of joint European technology 
initiatives and public-private partnerships that help tackle genuine market failures, as 
well as the creation and development of regional or local clusters.’ (p.23) 
The second part of the Integrated Guidelines, the Employment Guidelines, included quantitative 
employment targets: an average overall employment rate of 70%, with employment rates of at 
least 60% for women and of 50% for older workers (55-64 years). In addition, the guidelines 
offered some general recommendations to promote the quality of jobs. However, no reference 
was made to the interrelationships between innovation, and qualitative and quantitative aspects 
of employment; the two issues appear almost completely separate. Although the Guidelines aim 
to exploit synergies between quality at work, productivity and employment and to improve job 
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quality, including pay and benefits, working conditions, job security, access to lifelong learning 
and career prospects, it remains rather broad, and innovation only features for its intervening in 
labour productivity. 
The second communication More research and innovation – A common approach contained 
concrete policy measures through which the Commission intended to ‘put research and 
innovation at the heart of EU policies’ (EC, 2005b:5). The majority of these measures were 
related, however, to research, science and technology rather than innovative enterprises. For 
example, it aimed to create: a better regulatory framework for new technology, a more effective 
and efficient protection of IPR, an attractive single market for researchers, a better designed 
and more widely used system of tax incentives, and to use public procurement to foster research 
and innovation and make European Structural Funds as well as the Community Framework for 
State Aid for R&D more research and innovation oriented. 
There are, however, some new elements in this innovation policy document. First, it makes 
explicit reference to market failure approach as a rationale for state or EC-level intervention. 
Suggested interventions include R&D projects, technical feasibility studies, industrial property 
rights for SMEs, innovation advisory services and innovation support services, aid for young 
innovative enterprise and or aid for innovative clusters. This inclusion contrasts sharply with 
the argument of previous policy documents in which the system approach was adopted. Another 
new element is the inclusion of a stronger sectoral focus. The document admits that different 
sectors have different sectoral needs and specificities which have to be taken into consideration 
if innovation policy is to improve competitiveness. In relation to this sector-focused 
reorientation, a separate strategy exists aimed to promote innovative services in the EU and 
intervention to boost for process and organisational innovation in services is encouraged. The 
reason for targeting services is a belief that ‘Innovation in services … is typically less 
systematic’ and that services tend to ‘adopt [] business and organisational models and practices 
from more innovative sectors’ (EC 2006: 16-17). 
A slight shift can be detected towards non-technological innovation: in its introduction the 
Communication ‘addresses the full research and innovation spectrum, including non-
technological innovation’ (EC 2005b: 7). Although no further references are made on this point, 
in the abovementioned new framework of the State Aid programme, there is a separate section 
dealing with organisational innovation.)  
Qualification for this aid had the following criteria: 
‘(a) organisational innovation must always be related to the use and exploitation of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to change the organisation;  
(b) the innovation must be formulated as a project with an identified and qualified 
project manager, as well as identified project costs;  
(c) the result of the aided project must be the development of a standard, of a business 
model, methodology or concept, which can be systematically reproduced, possibly 
certified, and possibly patented;  
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(d) the process or organisational innovation must be new or substantially improved 
compared to the state of the art in its industry in the Community. The novelty could be 
demonstrated by the Member States for instance on the basis of a precise description of 
the innovation, comparing it with state of the art process or organisational techniques 
used by other undertakings in the same industry;  
(e) the process or organisational innovation project must entail a clear degree of risk. 
This risk could be demonstrated by the Member State for instance in terms of: project 
costs in relation to company turnover, time required to develop the new process, 
expected gains from the process innovation by comparison with the project costs, 
probability of failure.’ (EC 2006: 17) 
The document still echoes the important objective of having more and better jobs but no explicit 
reference is made on the relationship between innovation and job quality. 
 
Crisis and the third phase (2008-2010) 
 
The last phase of the Lisbon Strategy was dominated by the global financial crisis and economic 
downturn. The European Commission responded by launching the European Economic 
Recovery Plan (EC 2008). The aim of the Plan was twofold: first to safeguard the purchasing 
power of the people in order to maintain demand; and, second, to direct short-term actions in 
selected areas with the aim of maintaining Europe’s future competitiveness. The Commission 
determined four priority areas: people, business, infrastructure and energy, and research and 
innovation. This latter area included three main fields of actions:  
 
1. Increase investment in R&D, innovation and education.  
2. Develop clean technologies for cars and construction.  
3. High-speed internet for all.  
The second type of actions included ‘smart’ investments, combining innovation and the green 
economy, and maintaining the competitiveness of some key European industries (i.e. car 
manufacturing and construction). As such, the plan was consistent with the existing priorities 
of the Lisbon Strategy. 
It has been suggested that the Lisbon Agenda was over-ambitious and that ‘reporting fatigue’ 
became an issue with more progress indicators being added on which Member States had to 
report. Moreover, prior to having to respond to the economic crisis that emerged from the global 
financial crisis , the EU was expanding to incorporate Central and Eastern European countries, 
most of which were poor and had less resource capacity than larger and richer existing member 
states (Casey 2009). 
 
Horizon 2020 and its first evaluation 
 
In the new European strategy, Horizon 2020, innovation remains an important issue and is one 
of seven flagship initiatives. The aim is to adopt a more strategic approach to innovation so that 
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is becomes an ‘overarching policy objective’ (EC 2010a: 2). The flagship Innovation Union 
initiative identifies three main weaknesses within the European innovation system:  
 
‘1) Under-investment in our knowledge foundation. Other countries, like the US and 
Japan, are out-investing us, and China is rapidly catching up. 
2) Unsatisfactory framework conditions, ranging from poor access to finance, high costs 
of IPR to slow standardisation and ineffective use of public procurement. This is a 
serious handicap when companies can choose to invest and conduct research in many 
other parts of the world. 
3) Too much fragmentation and costly duplication. We must spend our resources more 
efficiently and achieve critical mass.’ (EC 2010a: 2) 
The Innovation Union is built around 34 specific commitments in five main thematic areas: 
strengthening the knowledge base and reducing fragmentation; getting good ideas to market; 
maximising social and territorial cohesion; pooling forces to achieve breakthroughs: European 
Innovation Partnerships; leveraging policies externally. 
Overall, the strategy aims to link better research and innovation to each other in order to get out 
more value from investments in research into innovation. Of the 34 commitments, some are 
more pertinent to this Working Paper. Again, and despite the financial and economic crisis, one 
of the primary aims of the strategy remains increasing R&D&I investments to 3% as a share of 
GDP in all Member States. The strategy argues that investments in education, R&D&I, 
innovation and ICTs should be protected from budget cuts. The strategy not only aims to 
increase the amount of investment in R&D&I but also wants to use this money in a more 
effective way by tackling fragmentation in research and innovation systems at EU and national 
levels. Modernisation of the education system includes the creation of more world-class 
universities and the attracting of top talent from abroad. The European Research Area also 
needs to be strengthened to promote the cross-border cooperation of European researchers and 
innovators, and to ensure a free movement of knowledge. The EU also wants to simplify its 
own R&D&I programmes, ensure that access to them is open to everyone in an equal way. The 
leverage effect of public spending on private sector investments also has to be enhanced, the 
document argues. Public procurements also have to be used in a more strategic way promoting 
innovation activities of the enterprises. Obstacles to bringing ideas to market have to be 
removed. Fast-growing SMEs in particular are targets for the easing of access to finance and 
making intellectual property rights more affordable to enterprises. 
In addition, the documents signals that the European Regional Development Fund should 
support projects that are based on smart regional specialisation strategies reflecting the special 
needs, strengths and weaknesses of regions.  
In order to tackle societal challenges more effectively, the strategy launched a special 
programme called the European Innovation Partnership (EIP). The main societal challenges 
identified by the strategy are:  
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… life-threatening diseases, new solutions to improve the lives of elder people, ways to 
radically cut CO2 emissions and other sources of pollution in particular in cities, 
alternative sources of energy and substitutes for increasingly scarce raw materials, 
reducing and recycling waste and ending landfill, improvements in the quality of our 
water supply, smart transport with less congestion, healthy or high-quality food stuffs 
using sustainable production methods and technologies for fast and secure information 
handling and sharing, communication and interfacing.’ (EC 2010a: 22)  
The partnership initiatives are expected to focus on one or two of these challenges and be 
accompanied by strong political and stakeholder commitment, creating clear added value for 
the EU so that there is a strong focus on results, outcomes and impacts underpinned by adequate 
financial support. The strategy emphasizes the importance of design and creative activities, 
innovation in the public sector and social innovations. 
In terms of assessing the progress of innovation activities by Member States, a set of indicators 
have been developed by the High Level Panel on the Measurement of Innovation established 
by Máire Geoghegan-Quinn, the former European Commissioner for Research and Innovation. 
The panel proposed five key indicators (EC 2010b: 4-6): 
1. Contribution of innovative-related trade in manufactured goods to the balance of trade 
of goods 
2. Share of fast growing and innovative firms in the economy 
3. Percentage of employment in knowledge intensive activities 
4. Patent applications weighted by GDP 
5. Hourly labour productivity 
The Panel also proposed a single composite indicator to capture innovation performance 
consisting of five variables: the number of patent applications filed under the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty per billion GDP, employment in knowledge-intensive activities in business 
industries (including financial services) as percentage of total employment, the contribution of 
medium and high-tech products exports to the trade balance, knowledge-intensive services 
exports as percentage of total service exports, and employment in fast-growing firms of 
innovative business industries, excluding financial services (EC 2013c: 12). 
In terms of monitoring the implementation of the strategy, a first internal evaluation was 
conducted in 2014 and another is currently under preparation by Ernst & Young, Open 
Evidence, Matrix and Wuppertal Institute. According to the first evaluation, the EU succeeded 
in reducing the innovation gap between EU-27 and its main competitors of the US and Japan 
by almost 50 per cent (EC 2014a: 11). Great efforts have been made in reducing fragmentation 
and overlaps in the European research system and researchers’ mobility has increased 
considerably. There have been successful gains in unitary patent regulation and public 
procurement. The availability of finance has become more accessible to enterprises, boosting 
venture capital and other risk-sharing schemes particularly in the SME sector. Five programmes 
have been launched within the framework of the European Innovation Partnerships: active and 
healthy ageing; water; agriculture; raw materials; and smart cities. As such the evaluation of 
the overall performance of the EIPs  concluded that ‘there are sound reasons for the EU to 
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continue promoting the EIP approach, provided that the EIPs target systemic innovation with a 
strong focus on diffusion of innovation’ (p.10).  
Further improvements are still needed to eliminate inconsistencies in rules and practices making 
innovation activity less burdensome and risky, especially by creating a real European single 
market. Another gap identified by the evaluation is the weak innovation culture within the EU. 
Although major achievements have been made in relation to public sector innovation, further 
progress is needed in this field. Whilst the strategy puts special emphasis on promoting the 
inclusive character of innovation in terms of equal access to both development capacities and 
the benefits of innovation, further steps need to be taken to strengthen this inclusion. In addition, 
the evaluation identifies considerable skills shortage and mismatches both in basic skills such 
as numeracy and literacy and skills more aligned to innovation –‘the 21st century skills for 
creativity and entrepreneurial spirit’ (p.11). Overall, in order to fully exploit the potential of the 
strategy, the evaluation stresses the need to continue its implementation drawing on the 
experiences gained during its first 4-5 years. 
In terms of its theoretical positioning, the new European innovation strategy represents a 
significant shift from the narrow towards the broad approach to innovation. However that shift 
appears to leave policy somewhere halfway between the two. In this respect it is important to 
note the launch of other contemporaneous EU initiatives such as the Commission’s Employment 
and social development in Europe 2014 publication. Chapter 3 of this document deals with the 
future of work in Europe, and makes explicit the importance of ‘job quality and work 
organisation for a smart and inclusive growth’13. In this respect, the DG GROW (the former 
DG ENTR) of the European Commission is supporting the diffusion of workplace innovation 
by creating the European Workplace Innovation Network (EUWIN) in 2013 with a remit to ‘to 
facilitate the exchange of good practices and promote workplace innovation (Pot 2015). 
It is also worth noting that since the launch of the Innovation Union (EC 2010), important policy 
priorities have been (re)defined. In addition to workplace innovation14, the six priority areas 
include: social innovation15, design-driven innovation16, demand-side innovation policies17, 
public sector innovation18 and public procurement of innovation19. All six priorities have their 
own policy background paper, action plans and other initiatives. Their respective aims are 
outlined in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Innovation Policies in the European Union (2013) 
Field Aims 
Social innovation • stimulating social innovation as a source of growth and jobs 
13 See Chapter 3 of this document. 
14 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/policy/workplace/index_en.htm 
15 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/policy/social/index_en.htm 
16 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/policy/design/index_en.htm 
17 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/policy/demand-side-policies/index_en.htm 
18 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/policy/public-sector/index_en.htm 
19 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/policy/public-procurement/index_en.htm 
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• promoting and sharing information about social innovation in Europe 
• supporting social innovation projects through the Social Innovation Competition. 
Design for 
innovation 
• to increase the use of design for innovation and growth across Europe; 
• to raise awareness of how design-driven innovation increases efficiency in public 
services and drives business growth; 
• to create capacity and competencies to deliver these policies. 
Public sector 
innovation 
• to strengthen innovation in the public sector a key player in the field as as a 
regulator, service provider, and employer 
• to build an efficient and productive public sector becoming a strong driver of 
private sector growth 
• to reach efficiency gains, better governance, faster delivery, and more citizens' 
involvement in public sector 
Public 
procurement of 
innovation 
• help foster market uptake of innovative products and services 
• increase the quality of public services in markets where the public sector is a 
significant purchaser 
• support access to markets for businesses, especially small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) 
• help address major societal challenges. 
Workplace 
innovation 
• to improve performance and working lives, and encourages creativity of employees 
through positive organisational changes; 
• to combine leadership with hands-on, practical knowledge of frontline employees; 
• to engage all stakeholders in the process of change; 
• to develop methods and indicators for measuring this type of innovation 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/policy/index_en.htm 
 
With respect to workplace innovation, the Commission also compiled a report on a 
methodology for its measurement (EC 2014b). This methodology is important as it can be 
regarded as a first step to linking together job quality and innovation: ‘Workplace innovation is 
considered contributing to European competitiveness: It encompasses practices that enhance 
employers’ workability, resulting in higher productivity and improved employees’ job-
satisfaction and wellbeing. Workplace innovation, hence, is a cross-cutting policy issue, 
concerning all types of organisations, be they large firms, SMEs or even public administrations’ 
(EC 2014b:6). 
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3  Calls to broaden the concept of innovation in EU policies 
 
In this section we briefly outline the key critiques of European innovation policies that have 
emerged from within the recent scientific literature on innovation. These selected critiques 
focus on two main issues: the policy orientation per se and the relationship between innovation, 
employment and job quality.  
The key critique comes from Lundvall (2014) in the Guest Essays series of the EUWIN 
network. Lundvall argues that one of the reasons why European economies underperform is the 
deteriorated quality of jobs in Europe as an outcome of the global economics and financial 
crisis. Lundvall acknowledges that an important feature of the Lisbon Strategy was that it aimed 
to improve simultaneously the qualitative and quantitative aspects of employment through 
‘more and better jobs’. This dual focus was even more remarkable as it ran counter to then 
dominant assumptions about a trade-off existing between job quality and rates of employment. 
However, Lundvall points out, the notion of job quality was never made operational and the 
mid-term review dropped job quality as an issue to focus only on raising the employment rate. 
This marginalisation is compounded according to Lundvall in the vagueness surrounding the 
formulation of priorities such as ‘more and better lives’ in the new EU growth strategy Europe 
2020 (EC 2012) strategy EU2020. 
On the basis of empirical research with his European colleagues, Lundvall proposes to 
operationalise the notion of job quality. According to this proposal, the two most important 
aspects of job quality are learning opportunities offered by work organisations and the level of 
discretion (job autonomy) employees exercise over their work tasks. Jobs are better that offer 
these learning opportunities and autonomy; he posits that: ‘those who operate in these jobs are 
significantly more satisfied with their work situation than the others’ (Lorenz et al. 2004, cited 
in Lundvall, 2014: 2). Moreover there is a clear link to innovation: ‘we have shown that these 
jobs contribute to an innovative economy (Lundvall, 2014: 2; also Arundel et al. 2007). 
Expanding on this argument, and drawing on data from different waves of the European 
Working Conditions Survey, Lundvall identifies four types of work organisation: discretionary 
learning, lean production, Taylorism and traditional. Lundvall characterises good job quality as 
the share of employees working in the discretionary learning form of work organisation because 
it offers the best learning opportunities and highest degree of task discretion for employees. The 
data show that this share increased between 2000 and 2005 when the total level of employment 
also increased indicating a positive correlation between job quality and employment rates. 
However, from 2000 to 2010 a significant fall was observed in job quality in the majority of 
the EU-15 countries for non-management employees. This fall was particularly strong in 
leading-edge innovator countries such as Austria, Denmark and Finland. The cases of Sweden 
and the Netherlands are interesting because the share of non-managerial employees working in 
discretionary learning organisations decreased between 2000 and 2010 by about 5 percentage 
points, while overall the number of employees engaged in this type of work organisation 
increased by 8.5 and 3.9 percentage points respectively. By contrast, in Portugal and Spain the 
share of both non-managerial and all employees increased by a considerable extent. (These two 
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countries seem to be the exception to the rule and the reasons of this trend need further country-
specific investigation.) 
 
Table 3: Share of non-managerial and all workers engaged in discretionary learning 
jobs 2000 and 2010 in EU-15 countries 
 2000 2010 
Non-managerial All employees Non-managerial All employees 
Austria 39.5 51.8 32.3 44.5 
Belgium 34.2 44.9 31.9 42.6 
Denmark 55.5 64.7 43.3 61.1 
Finland 39.6 44.1 29.7 43.8 
France 26.0 38.0 20.2 30.6 
Germany 34.8 47.6 29.5 41.6 
Greece 16.6 23.3 13.7 23.4 
Italy 32.2 41.7 27.6 40.4 
Ireland 16.6 22.7 17.2 22.6 
Luxembourg 29.2 41.6 26.5 34.7 
Netherlands 49.3 59.6 44.1 63.5 
Portugal 18.4 23.8 27.9 35.2 
Spain 15.3 25.6 20.5 27.2 
Sweden 41.1 57.0 36.4 66.5 
United Kingdom 19.9 25.9 16.8 27.3 
Source: Lundvall (2014:5); EC (2015:185-187). 
Unfortunately there is no similar data available for the New Member States (NMS) on the 
evolution of the share of non-managerial employees; Table 4 below shows data for all 
employees only. The trends among the NMS countries are more ambiguous. In some countries 
the share of employees working in discretionary learning organisations decreased from 2000 to 
2010 while in other countries it has increased. The former group of countries consists of 
Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria Romania, Poland, Lithuania and 
Latvia. The decrease was particularly significant in the case of Hungary (41.4 vs. 32.8%), Czech 
Republic (39.3 vs. 28.6%) and Bulgaria (23.2 vs. 11.9%), whilst Latvia (29.8 vs. 44.0%) and 
Romania (17.3 vs. 25.2%) showed significant increase in the same period of time. 
 
 
Table 4: Share of all employees engaged in discretionary learning jobs 2000 and 2010 in 
the NMS 
Country 2000 2010 
Latvia 29.8 44.0 
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Slovenia 45.0 42.2 
Estonia 40.5 38.4 
Poland 36.7 39.1 
Lithuania 24.2 28.1 
Hungary 41.4 32.8 
Slovakia 24.2 28.7 
Czech Rep. 39.3 28.6 
Romania 17.3 25.2 
Bulgaria 23.2 11.9 
Source: EC (2015:185-187). 
 
What is interesting in Lundvall and his colleagues’ argument is that learning and autonomy are 
the two key elements that link together the issues of innovation, employment and job quality. 
They make an additional, equally interesting, point about equality and social divisions of labour 
within workplaces based on this data. In this respect, Lundvall tries to capture the inclusive 
character of the different workplaces by comparing changes in job quality according to 
occupational groups of managerial and non-managerial employees. In a similar way, 
investigating employee involvement and work organisations in Europe, in work for Eurofound, 
Gallie and Zhou found significant differences between different country groups of European 
member states: ‘Occupational class differences were notably less great in the Continental and 
the Nordic country groups than in the other country groups. In the Continental and the Nordic 
groups, managers and professionals were almost 4 times more likely than non-skilled workers 
to be in high involvement organisations. But in the Southern group they were 7 times, in the 
East-Central group 8 times and in the East-North group 12 times more likely than the non-
skilled to be in such organisations’ (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions, 2012: 32). Despite a concern within innovation policy about generating 
inclusive employment and recognition of the need to change management in order to boost 
innovation (e.g. EC 1995), this type of analysis has been absent from innovation policy 
documents over the past 20 years. 
 
This absence has become a weakness in innovation policy and relates in part to the general 
problem of how innovation is measured. The Commission monitors the innovation performance 
of the Member States through the Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS) and through the 
Summary Innovation Index (SII). The Scoreboard was first created in 2002 and has been revised 
several times since. The SII is a composite indicator of 25 sub-indicators. As the primary 
monitoring tool of the Commission, whilst also reflecting as well as including the 
Commission’s innovation policy approach, its importance should not be under-played. In a 
recent research paper analysing the tool, Havas et al. (2015) revealed a strong bias towards 
R&D-based innovations in these indicators – that is, they clearly lean towards the narrow 
approach to innovation (see Table 5 below). As they point out, among the 25 indicators ‘10 
indicators are only relevant for, and a further four mainly capture, R&D-based innovations; 
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seven could be relevant for both types of innovations; and a mere four focus on non-R&D-
based innovations. Given that (i) the IUS is used by the European Commission to monitor 
progress, and (ii) its likely impact on national policy-makers, this bias towards R&D-based 
innovation is a source of major concern’ (p.18). 
Table 5: The 2014 Innovation Union Scoreboard indicators 
 Relevance 
for R&D- 
based 
innovation 
Relevance for 
non-R&D- 
based 
innovation 
Human resources 
New doctorate graduates (ISCED 6) per 1000 population aged 25-34 X  
Percentage population aged 30-34 having completed tertiary education B b 
Percentage  youth  aged  20-24 having attained at least upper secondary 
level education B b 
Open, excellent and attractive research systems 
International scientific co-publications per million population X  
Scientific publications among the top 10% most cited publications 
worldwide as % of total scientific publications of the country X 
 
Non-EU doctorate students1 as a % of all doctorate students X  
Finance and support 
R&D expenditure in the public sector as % of GDP X  
Venture capital investment as % of GDP X  
Firm investments 
R&D expenditure in the business sector as % of GDP X  
Non-R&D innovation expenditures as % of turnover  X 
Linkages & entrepreneurship 
SMEs innovating in-house as % of SMEs b b 
Innovative SMEs collaborating with others as % of SMEs b b 
Public-private co-publications per million population X  
Intellectual assets 
PCT patents applications per billion GDP (in PPS€) X  
PCT patent applications in societal challenges per billion GDP (in PPS€) 
(environment-related technologies; health) X 
 
Community trademarks per billion GDP (in PPS€)  X 
Community designs per billion GDP (in PPS€)  X 
Innovators 
SMEs introducing product or process innovations as % of SMEs b b 
SMEs introducing marketing or organisational innovations as % of SMEs  X 
Economic effects 
Employment in fast growing enterprises in innovative sectors (% of total 
employment) b b 
Employment in knowledge-intensive activities (manufacturing and 
services) as % of total employment x 
 
Contribution of medium and high-tech product exports to the trade balance x  
Knowledge-intensive services exports as % total service exports x  
Sales of new to market and new to firm innovations as % of turnover b b 
License and patent revenues from abroad as % of GDP X  
Source: Havas et al. (2015:18). 
Legend: X: only relevant; x: mainly relevant; b: relevant for both types. 
 
If analysis of the measures is narrowed further to cover non-technological and organisational 
innovation, the following indicators are directly or indirectly related to this type of innovation: 
Non-R&D innovation expenditures as percentage of turnover, Innovative SMEs collaborating 
with other firms as percentage of SMEs and the share of SMEs introducing marketing or 
23 
 
  
organisational innovations. This short list reveals that indicators measuring non-technological 
and organisational innovations are markedly under-represented in the SII. Moreover job quality 
is completely missing, even from the outcome indicators labelled as ‘Economic effects’. 
Another imbalance in the range of indicators is evident in the exclusive focus on knowledge-
intensive and medium and high-tech sectors. As Havas et al. rightly note, for a number of 
reasons, the low-tech sector is also important:  
 
First, the economic weight of low- and medium-low technology (LMT) sectors are 
significant in terms of output and employment: these sectors account for around 40% of 
the EU manufacturing jobs. Second, while the bulk of innovation activities in LMT 
sectors are not based on intramural R&D efforts, these sectors also improve their 
performance by innovations. Firms in the LMT sectors are usually engaged in the DUI 
mode of innovation (that is, relying on learning by doing, using and interacting), but 
they also draw on advanced S&T results available through the so-called distributed 
knowledge bases, as well as advanced materials, production equipment, software and 
various other inputs (e.g. electronics components and sub-systems) supplied by the so-
called high-tech (HT) industries. (p.42) 
This point leads to a more general question about whether innovation should target specific 
sectors. On the one hand, fast growing sectors create more jobs and are therefore a legitimate 
objective for support of innovation policy. On the other hand, traditional sectors have a greater 
number of employees, and established firms and industries spend more money on R&D&I than 
SMEs operating in fast-growing new sectors. In fact, the separation of ‘old’ and ‘new’ sectors 
is artificial; they often linked and build on each other. However, the dominant mode of 
innovation differs. In established industries, process innovation occurs more often based on 
knowledge accumulated within the firm through everyday practice, while in emerging sectors 
product innovation dominates creating more new jobs. It is also worth noting that European 
countries have different industrial structures. The examples of Denmark and Austria show that 
innovation can be maintained at a world-class level even with low-tech industries (Lundvall 
2009; Peneder 1999). 
Finally, another shortcoming of the index relates to the indicators measuring R&D&I 
expenditure. As Edquist (2014) rightly notes, not all resources spent on R&D will be 
transformed into innovations and it is hard to demonstrate how effectively expenditure on R&D 
translates into innovation (of any kind) (see also Edler et al. 2013). This measurement problem 
is particularly salient in the case of the number of new doctorate graduates or for the 
participation rate in secondary or tertiary education. These measures may have some influence 
on innovation activities in a given country but the linkage is mostly indirect. Nevertheless, 10 
out of 25 indicators in the SII measure this kind of input activities:  
• New doctorate graduates (ISCED 6) per 1000 population aged 25-34;  
• Percentage population aged 30-34 having completed tertiary education;  
• Percentage youth aged 20-24 having attained at least upper secondary level education;  
• International scientific co-publications per million population;  
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• Scientific publications among the top 10% most cited publications worldwide as % of 
total scientific publications of the country;  
• Non-EU doctorate students as a % of all doctorate students;  
• R&D expenditure in the public sector as % of GDP;  
• Venture capital investment as % of GDP;  
• R&D expenditure in the business sector as % of GDP;  
• Non-R&D innovation expenditures as % of turnover.  
Many of these indicators measure research and education instead of innovation. However, as 
Edquist (2014: 10) stresses: ‘It is also hard to know exactly what kinds of education have (what 
kinds of) effects on (what kinds of) innovation and what kinds do not.’ The argument, according 
to which outcomes of research and education can be regarded as an input for innovation in such 
an automatic and mechanistic way is empirically untested and perhaps even untestable and 
instead simply reflect the assumptions and expectations underpinning the narrow approach to 
innovation. 
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4  Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Boosting innovation has been a core feature of a sequence of EU policies over the past twenty 
years at least. As the EU now seeks to grow its post-crisis economy, innovation has become a 
flagship initiative. There are two approaches to understanding and supporting innovation – a 
narrow approach and a broad approach. In the narrow approach, state intervention is justified 
by market failure and innovation is characterised as linear, focusing on radical and 
technological innovation of the manufacturing sector on the basis of scientific, explicit and 
individual knowledge. The broad approach acknowledges the importance of user-driven, 
interaction-based, recursive innovation not only in manufacturing but also in services, with 
public services having a key supportive role. Over the last twenty years, EU innovation policy 
has evolved theoretically, with a remarkable shift from the narrow to the broad approach. For a 
number of reasons, this shift is, however, partial and incomplete. 
First, there is a considerable gap between the theoretical understanding now underpinning EU 
innovation policy and that policy’s measures. In other words there is dissonance between policy 
intent on the one hand and policy implementation, measurement and evaluation on the other. 
As the Green Paper on Innovation (1995) highlights, on a theoretical level, EU innovation 
policy has embraced the broad, systemic or holistic approach to innovation as early as the mid-
1990s. The Green Paper seemed to align with then latest scientific thinking about innovation, 
including recognising the importance of organisational innovation. Nevertheless, this 
theoretical understanding barely reflects in action plans and on the instruments for measuring 
policy attainment and evaluation. Instead the measures used are derived from the narrow 
approach to innovation. The different phases of the Lisbon Strategy from 2000-2010) represent 
a wider retreat to the narrow approach. One of the key policy documents (EC, 2005b), for 
example, makes explicit reference to market failure argument at a theoretical level, and the 
concrete policy measures proposed also reflected the narrow approach of innovation targeting 
research, science and technology rather than innovative enterprises by creating a better 
regulatory framework for new technology, a more effective and efficient protection of IPR, an 
attractive single market for researchers, a better designed and more widely used system of tax 
incentives, etc. The latest innovation policy emanating from the Europe 2020 growth strategy 
initiated in 2010 (EC, 2010a) shows some promising initiatives providing some counterbalance 
to the previous adoption of the narrow approach. Some policy priorities have been redefined, 
recognising the importance of policies aimed to foster workplace innovation, social innovation, 
design-driven innovation, demand-side innovation, public sector innovation and public 
procurement of innovation. All of these six priorities have their own policy background paper, 
action plans and other initiatives. This evolution of EU innovation policy is outlined in Table 6 
below.
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Table 6: The evolution of EU innovation policies 1995-2015 
 Green Paper (1995) Lisbon I (2000-2005) Lisbon II (2005-2008) 
Lisbon III (2008-
2010) 
Horizon 2020 
Elements of broad-
based innovation 
concept 
Fully applied broad-
based approach 
A slight shift from 
linear towards 
systemic approach 
appears only in 200320 
Public procurement as 
a tool to boost 
innovation 
No significant changes 
compared to Lisbon II 
Top 6 priorities: social 
innovation; design-driven 
innovation; demand-side 
innovation policies; public 
sector innovation; public 
procurement of innovation; 
workplace innovation 
Elements of narrow 
innovation concept 
In terms of proposed 
policy measures, it 
remains technology-
oriented: importance 
of technological 
innovation, scientific, 
explicit and individual 
knowledge-base, the 
STI mode of 
innovation 
Strategic objective is 
to raise the share of 
R&D expenditures in 
the GDP from 1,9% to 
3% by 2010 
Focus is on R&D 
expenditures, green 
economy, strong 
industrial base and on 
innovation-friendly 
environment, explicit 
reference to market 
failure approach 
Increase investment in 
R&D, innovation and 
education. 
Develop clean 
technologies for cars 
and construction. 
High-speed internet 
for all 
Innovation statistics remained 
science and technology-
focused 
Measurement  Establishment of the European Innovation Scoreboard: no indicators on non-technological innovation and on Job Quality 
5 key indicators21 and the 
creation of Innovation Union 
Scoreboard and Summary 
Innovation Index 
Sector prioritised 
Innovation is 
important in low-tech 
sectors, in private and 
public segments of 
services 
No sectoral focus Promotes innovation in the services 
Green economy, car 
manufacturing and 
constructions 
Health and social service, 
green economy, public sector 
Interrelation of 
Innovation and Job 
Quality 
Recognised but poorly 
developed, more focus 
put on quantitative 
dimension of 
employment 
Exclusive focus on 
quantitative dimension 
of employment, 
although improving 
working conditions 
‘Better jobs’ dropped from the agenda 
Job quality is of high priority 
again, though not in direct 
relation with innovation 
20 Though this shift does not appear in concrete policy measures and action plans and remained mainly rhetoric: ‘enterprises are at the heart of the 
innovation process’ (EC, 2003a:5) 
21 Contribution of innovative-related trade in manufactured goods to the balance of trade of goods; Share of fast growing and innovative firms in the 
economy; Percentage of employment in knowledge intensive activities; Patent applications weighted by GDP; Hourly labour productivity. 
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becomes a strategic 
objective 
Social inclusion Does not appear 
Special emphasis on 
promoting inclusive character 
of innovation. 
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Second, although the theoretical basis of the innovation policies widens to take account 
of the broad approach to innovation, it does so in an incomplete, inconsistent and 
theoretically ill-founded way. For example, after the mid-term review of the Lisbon 
Strategy explicit reference was made in the renewed innovation policy to market 
failure arguments. This is a theoretical choice with a number of implicit consequences 
such as reliance in the science push model in which the main source of innovation is 
R&D. This reliance sharply contradicts other elements of the same innovation policy 
arguing that the heart of innovation is firms. These inconsistencies, together with the 
abovementioned gap between theory, implementation, measurement and evaluation, 
reveal that the system-focus approach has never been successfully applied. What 
remains constant over the past two decades within innovation policy are the 
technological focus, the linear view of innovation based on scientific research, and the 
supply-side-dominated policy measures. The weaknesses of this approach are 
numerous and obvious. Education, for example, is a long-standing concern within 
innovation policy and features strongly as a supply-side measure, however there is no 
reference in any of the policies to the demand side of skill, and what skills firms 
actually need and deploy generally, let alone in relation to innovation. Both supply and 
demand have a role (Edler et al. 2013). Instead, education is targeted almost 
exclusively as a supply side issue. This failure to look inside firms and at what levers 
and enables innovation in these firms also explains the absence in policy documents 
of any appreciation of the interrelation of innovation and job quality. Where job quality 
is mentioned, for example with the reference to wanting ‘better jobs’ in the first phase 
of the Lisbon Strategy and now, again, in Europe 2020, it is hugely undeveloped 
theoretically and practically as a policy issue per se and in relation to innovation. Yet, 
as Lundvall (2014) notes, workplace learning and autonomy may be the two key 
elements that link together the issues of innovation, employment and job quality. Skill 
development (part of learning) and skill deployment (or utilisation in current policy 
parlance)22 are integral components of job quality and plays a key role in the 
innovation performance of firms:  
Beyond the quantitative effect of new technologies on the number of 
employees, it is also important to investigate the qualitative effect of 
technological change on different categories of workers. The basic premise 
here is that innovations are skill-biased and, therefore, replace tasks 
traditionally carried out by unskilled workers with new jobs demanding skilled 
workers. (Vivarelli 2014: 138) 
What is puzzling about the way that policy continues to be dominated by the narrow 
approach to innovation is that this approach has been seriously challenged 
scientifically. Evidence suggests that organisational (i.e. non-technology) innovation 
plays a major role informs innovativeness and that there are clear synergies to be 
gained from this form of innovation and technological forms (Battisti and Stoneman 
2010). It is now also generally accepted that most innovation is not radical but 
incremental. However there is recent and growing evidence on the emergence of 
radical innovation generated by employee-driven innovation (EDI) reflecting the 
22 See Warhurst and Findlay (2012). 
                                                     
  
broad approach of innovation. In this respect Alasoini (2013: 20) calls attention to the 
work of Kesting and Ulhoi (2010), noting that: 
... there is no reason to limit the scope of EDI to incremental improvements ... 
radical innovations are often employee-driven; they derive from doing 
something unique, valuable and difficult to imitate or plan in detail through 
standard management procedures.  
There is clearly a task therefore for the policy and scientific communities to better 
articulate, and for the latter to better explain and make understood more effectively the 
advantages of the broad, system-driven approach to innovation, and for the former to 
better integrate research and policy making processes in the field of innovation. As 
Edquist (2014: 14) has noted:  
Innovation policy design is certainly lagging behind innovation research when 
it comes to being systemic, broad-based or holistic. This is clearly an example 
of a failure when it comes to the communication between innovation 
researchers and politicians in the field of innovation. This may be a strong 
reason to involve innovation researchers in policy design (formulation) and 
implementation to a much higher degree. There is a lot that policy-makers and, 
in particular, politicians can learn from innovation research, not only in 
principle or ‘analytically’, but also in policy practice. 
Although in EU-level innovation policy documents, the shift from narrow to broad 
approach is  incomplete and inconsistent, at country-level within the EU the shift is 
more comprehensive in some Members States, particularly those that have sought to 
link workplace development and workplace innovation. In this respect there is a clear 
division amongst EU countries, with those in the North actively making the link, with 
a complete absence in New Member States (Alasoini 2015). Finland is a good example 
of this ‘Nordic exceptionalism’ in the field of innovation and a willingness to look 
inside firms as part of a system-based approach. More than a decade ago, Finland 
launched a nationwide ‘Workplace Development Programme – TYKES’ with more 
than 1500 projects involving almost 350,000 workers. The objective of this 
programme was to simultaneously improve the Quality of Working Life (QWL) and 
productivity in Finnish workplaces. In addition to business-to-business networks, 
projects targeted work methods, work organisation, work community and supervision 
within firms. The 2012 launch of ‘Liideri – Business Productivity and Joy at Work’ 
programme represents the ‘next-generation’ workplace development programme and 
again reflecting the broad approach to innovation (Alasoini, 2015: 28-29). This focus 
of analysis is important because it enables thinking about innovation to recognise and 
appreciate the consequences of new production regimes with reconfigured 
management, work and employment practices. In addition, the Finnish approach 
enables innovation policy to capture not only firm-level but also system level practices 
that can help underpin innovation. As Alasoini points out: 
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The object of workplace development has expanded during the last 40-50 years 
from traditional issues at the shop-floor, work-station and work-unit levels to 
issues involving entire organizations, production systems and companies, and 
even company networks, industrial clusters, regional innovation systems and 
ecosystems. (p.25) 
The measurement involves not only more indicators of non-technological innovation 
but also more focus on ‘workplace innovation’, on the design of ‘good work’ and 
‘better jobs’.  
The types of innovation that feature in the narrow approach have their merits. However 
it would be helpful to EU innovation policy if the Commission engaged more 
comprehensively with and in a more sustained way with the broad approach. A lever 
to this end would be for the Commission to rethink the measurement of innovation. 
Measurement plays an essential role in policy thinking. Current measures effectively 
prohibit the necessary policy development. The Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS), 
formerly known as the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS), is based on 25 
indicators. It serves as a primary monitoring toolkit of the innovation performance of 
Member States. Analysis of the indicators highlights the dominance of narrow 
approach thinking as the majority of the indicators relate mainly to R&D-based 
technological innovation. However, as Havas et al. (2015: 42) rightly note:  
The current set of the IUS indicators can be seen either as a half-full or a half-
empty glass. Compared to the EIS 2004 … it is an improvement. Yet, a much 
more significant improvement is still needed for a better reflection of the 
diversity of innovation processes, which is indispensable for devising effective 
and sound policies.  
Although the problems in using these summary indexes are well known among the 
scientific community (e.g. Edler et al. 2013), they remain popular among policy-
makers as they appear to provide simple answers to complicated questions, and 
provide easy to formulate policy responses – more graduates, more R&D spending, 
more patents etc. In this respect, the lack of consensus currently amongst the scientific 
community about the definition and operationalisation of job quality (Muñoz de 
Bustillo et al. 2011; Findlay et al. 2013) might explain its weak pursuance by the 
Commission in innovation policy. Assuming that this consensus can be achieved 
(Warhurst and Knox 2015), it could be incorporated into a revised set of measures of 
innovation. In this respect, the methodological bias of the IUS, with its excessive 
emphasis on R&D-based innovations and widely used to inform policy design, needs 
to be revised if traction is to be gained in better understanding innovation and 
redesigning innovation policy to make it more effective. This new and better 
innovation summary index might include: 
• variables to capture non-technological as well as technology innovation – that 
is, most obviously, covering  all four types of innovation outlined in the Oslo 
Manual.  
2 
 
  
• variables capturing national and EU-wide institutional arrangements that 
provide the context and conditions for innovation (e.g. employment regulation, 
industrial relations, management education, finance, accountancy and tax 
regimes etc.); 
• variables that enable analysis of firm-level practices in terms of employment, 
work organisation, management etc., all of which reflect job quality; 
• variables measuring innovation activities of low and medium-low technology 
sectors; manufacturing as well as services, including in the latter those of the 
public sector. 
 
Some of these additions could be drawn from existing EU surveys, of which there are 
a number that currently offer innovation-related data but which are not used for this 
purpose, for example the European Working Conditions Survey. It might also usefully 
extend to incorporate qualitative research methods, for example with firm-level case 
studies that triangulate objective and subjective data. This latter type of data gathering 
would also help better understanding of the interplay between the context, content, 
process and outcomes of the various types of innovations at the level at which more 
and better innovation needs to occur within the EU – firms. 
 
Importantly, this revised innovation index would be used not only for monitoring 
innovation performance but also for measuring the effects of different policy 
instruments. This evaluation would help the necessary refocusing of policy thinking. 
As Edquist (2014: 29) argues: 
 
Ideally, we should be able to estimate the importance of each innovation policy 
instrument by measuring its effects on (different kinds of) innovations. … 
Nonetheless, it may be achieved by means of considerable effort aimed at more 
widespread, profound and independent evaluations. In the longer term, this is 
the only reasonable way. Evaluations are badly needed.’   
Better support for innovation is required from the Commission. However this support 
cannot be driven by the market failure argument as a justification of intervention. 
Market failure has many sources – economies of scale and scope, asymmetric 
information, externalities etc.23 – but all of which are essentially reactive. EU 
innovation policy has to be proactive because, by its very nature, innovation support 
has to be nurturing and forward-thinking, based on the analysis of the characteristics, 
strengths and weaknesses of innovation eco-systems (Ramstad 2014).   
To this end, this Working Paper offers general recommendations for EU innovation 
policy:  
1. It should more comprehensively incorporate the range of types of innovation 
into policy thinking and policy design.  
23 For a literature review, see: BIS (2010). 
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2. It needs to better consolidate its approach to innovation in terms of drawing on 
the broad approach to innovation. 
3. It needs to better consolidate the scope of innovation policy targeting to be 
more representative of EU economic and employment structures. 
4. The changes signalled in #1, #2 and #3 have to be pursued in policy in a way 
that is sustained and coherent as a prelude to their evaluation.  
5. Measurement tools must be revised appropriately to reflect the changes 
signalled in #1, #2 and #3, including the relationships of innovation to job 
quality and employment. 
6. In support of these other recommendations, the Commission should better 
incorporate scientific evidence into innovation policy deliberation and design. 
The aim of QuInnE is to support the EU 2020 growth strategy. Both reflecting and in 
further pursuance of the recommendations above, QuInnE will assist EU policy-
makers to formulate new and modify existing policies aimed at successful economic 
recovery and growth in line with the Commission’s Europe 2020 strategy by exploring 
the mutually reinforcing relationship between innovation and job quality and its 
employment outcomes, the latter in terms of inclusion and equality. QuInnE will 
explore statistically the relationships between innovation, job quality and employment 
outcomes, seeking to refine and update the correlations between them as well as 
identify and comment upon the strengths and weaknesses in current EU statistical data. 
It will also explore the causal relationships between innovation, job quality and 
employment outcomes through firm level qualitative research. The outcome will be 
the provision of high quality new and novel research for Europe 2020 that will help 
the Commission with its aim to boost innovation, job quality and employment. 
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